Florida Law Review
Volume 61

Issue 5

Article 1

December 2009

Bush, Gore, Florida, and the Constitution
Akhil Reed Amar

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Akhil Reed Amar, Bush, Gore, Florida, and the Constitution, 61 Fla. L. Rev. 945 (2009).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss5/1

This Dunwody Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Amar: Bush, Gore, Florida, and the Constitution

Florida Law Review
Founded 1948
Formerly
University of Florida Law Review

VOLUME 61

DECEMBER 2009

NUMBER 5

DUNWODY DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW
BUSH, GORE, FLORIDA, AND THE CONSTITUTION
Akhil Reed Amar∗
I.

THE COURT(S) AND THE CONSTITUTION(S) ............................ 946

II.

THE ROLE(S) OF THE LEGISLATURE(S) ................................... 957

III.

EQUAL PROTECTION ............................................................... 961

IV.

VOTER INTENT IN BUSH VERSUS GORE AND BUSH V. GORE ... 964

V.

REFORM.................................................................................. 967

Ten years ago this week, Dunwody Lecturer Cass Sunstein stood at
this podium and offered some thoughts about the then–recent
impeachment of President Clinton. Professor Sunstein titled his remarks
Lessons from a Debacle: From Impeachment to Reform.1 Today I shall
share with you some thoughts about a different debacle, one that arose
not from the effort to oust Bill Clinton, but from the effort to choose his
successor.
The failed attempt to remove Clinton in the late 1990s and the BushGore Florida extravaganza of 2000 share some obvious similarities.
Both dramas gripped the nation and the world, dominating the headlines
and the airwaves day after day. Both episodes featured intense, highstakes political partisanship, not just behind the scenes, but also in the
spotlight. Both chapters in America’s unfolding constitutional saga
forced participants to ask themselves whether, where, and how a
∗ Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University. This essay derives
from the Dunwody Lecture delivered at the University of Florida on March 24, 2009. Special
thanks to Lindsey Worth for her incomparable legal research, analytic commentary, and
editorial assistance. Thanks also to the commentators for their willingness to engage the ideas
presented in this essay, and in particular to Rick Hasen for directing me to several articles that
had escaped my initial survey of the vast literature on Bush v. Gore.
1. Cass R. Sunstein, Lessons from a Debacle: From Impeachment to Reform, 51 FLA. L.
REV. 599 (1999).
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coherent line could be drawn separating law from raw politics. And
both times, Al Gore was the odd man out. (Remember, had Bill
Clinton’s opponents actually succeeded in forcing him from office in
early 1999, his loyal Veep would have become President long before
“butterfly ballots” and “dimpled chads” entered the national lexicon.)
In the years since the Florida recount, constitutional scholars from
across the spectrum have weighed in with detailed legal analyses of
many of the relevant statutory and constitutional issues. Two
particularly fine collections of legal essays were published as books by
the University of Chicago Press and by Yale University Press.2
(Interestingly enough, the ubiquitous Professor Sunstein published three
essays in these books;3 yet another essay was authored by Professor
Frank Michelman, who stood at this podium as the Dunwody Lecturer
exactly one decade before Professor Sunstein and prophetically
addressed the topic of voting rights.)4
At this late date—now that all the shouting here in Florida has
subsided and so many scholarly assessments are already in print—some
of you may quite reasonably be wondering whether there are any new
things left to say about the Bush-Gore episode. In what follows, I hope
to put the various pieces of the Bush-Gore puzzle together in a
distinctive way and to highlight a few points that are not yet widely
understood.
I. THE COURT(S) AND THE CONSTITUTION(S)
Let’s start by noticing that a wide range of scholars seem to agree
with the following proposition: “The Supreme Court twisted the law in
the Bush-Gore affair.” But here’s the rub: Which Supreme Court did the
twisting? Some scholars (mostly liberals) say that the United States
Supreme Court played fast and loose with the law, while other scholars
(mostly conservatives) insist that it was the Florida Supreme Court that
acted in a lawless, partisan fashion.
Before I offer my own take on this topic, let me give you a flavor of
the highly charged commentary thus far. On January 13, 2001, a month
after the U.S. Supreme Court definitively ended the Florida recount,
2. BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman ed., Yale University
Press 2002) [hereinafter LEGITIMACY]; THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE AND THE SUPREME COURT (Cass
R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., University of Chicago Press 2001) [hereinafter THE
VOTE].
3. See Cass R. Sunstein, Does the Constitution Enact the Republican Party Platform?
Beyond Bush v. Gore, in LEGITIMACY, supra note 2, at 177; Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction: Of
Law and Politics, in THE VOTE, supra note 2, at 1; Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, in id.,
at 205.
4. Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, in THE VOTE, supra note 2, at 123;
Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting
Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443 (1989).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss5/1

2

Amar: Bush, Gore, Florida, and the Constitution

2009]

DUNWODY DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW

947

more than 500 law professors from over 100 schools published a joint
statement in the New York Times.5 Signatories included Stanford’s
Margaret Jean Radin, Mark Kelman, and William Cohen; Columbia’s
George Fletcher; Yale’s Robert Gordon; NYU’s Derrick Bell; the
University of Michigan’s Terrance Sandalow; and the University of
Texas’s Sanford Levinson, to mention just a few.6 In brief, their joint
statement charged that:
By stopping the vote count in Florida, the U.S. Supreme
Court used its power to act as political partisans, not judges
of a court of law . . . [T]he conservative justices moved to
avoid the “threat” that Americans might learn that in the
recount, Gore got more votes than Bush. . . . But it is not
the job of the courts to polish the image of legitimacy of the
Bush presidency by preventing disturbing facts from being
confirmed. Suppressing the facts to make the Bush
government seem more legitimate is the job of
propagandists, not judges.7
Elaborating on her views in the Yale University Press book, Bush v.
Gore: The Question of Legitimacy, Professor Radin pulled no punches:
[I]nstead of deciding the case in accordance with
preexisting legal principles, . . . five Republican members
of the Court decided the case in a way that is recognizably
nothing more than a naked expression of these justices’
preference for the Republican Party. . . . [T]he Republican
justices’ “analysis” doesn’t pass the laugh test, particularly
their decisions to stop the vote count and to forbid the
Florida Supreme Court from addressing the constitutional
problems the federal Supreme Court purported to find. . . .
How many readers can say with a straight face that if
the case had been Gore v. Bush—that is, if all facts were
the same except that Florida was controlled by Democratic
officials, Gore were a few hundred votes ahead in the
count, and Gore brought a federal case to stop a recount
Bush had sought under state law—it would have come out
the same?
. . . We cannot now afford, I think, to pretend that we
5. 554 Law Professors Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2001, at A7.
6. Id.
7. Id. (capitalization altered).
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see the rule of law when we know that we are seeing the
opposite. That is why I refer here to Republican justices
rather than simply justices; they have forfeited the
presumption of impartiality that goes with the judicial role.8
Several other distinguished contributors to The Question of
Legitimacy volume leveled similar accusations of lawlessness against
the United States Supreme Court. Professor Jed Rubenfeld proclaimed
that Bush v. Gore was, “as a legal matter, utterly indefensible. . . . There
was no December 12 deadline. The majority made it up. On this
pretense, the presidential election was determined.”9 On Rubenfeld’s
view, the “illegality,” “breathtaking indefensibility,” and “wrongness”
of the Justices’ action reflected a complete lack of judicial principle,
thereby making Bush v. Gore “worse even than the notorious Plessy.”10
Professor Jack Balkin opened his essay as follows: “On December 12,
2000, the Supreme Court of the United States illegally stopped the
presidential election and handed the presidency to George W. Bush.”11
Professor Bruce Ackerman offered a similarly harsh assessment:
I . . . protest[] in the name of the rule of law.
. . . To demand equal protection but to prevent Florida
from satisfying this demand—this is not bad legal
judgment; this is sheer willfulness.
The Court’s defense—that no time remained for Florida to
meet the state’s own December 12 deadline—is simply
preposterous. Florida law contains no such “deadline.”
Every lawyer knows that the Supreme Court should
have sent the case back to the Florida courts . . .
And the court gave no legally valid reason for this act
of usurpation.12
So much for the scholars on one side of the debate. Now, hear the
voices of scholars who saw the Florida Supreme Court as the lawless
villain in the drama. Professor Richard Epstein condemned the Florida
8. Margaret Jane Radin, Can the Rule of Law Survive Bush v. Gore?, in LEGITIMACY,
supra note 2, at 114–15, 117, 122.
9. Jed Rubenfeld, Not as Bad as Plessy. Worse, in LEGITIMACY, supra note 2, at 20, 26.
10. Id. at 20–21.
11. Jack M. Balkin, Legitimacy and the 2000 Election, in LEGITIMACY, supra note 2, at
210 (emphasis added).
12. Bruce Ackerman, Off Balance, in LEGITIMACY, supra note 2, at 195–96.
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Supreme Court for its “manifest errors” and its “abuse of discretion for
partisan political ends.”13 Then-Professor Michael McConnell was even
blunter:
In the Florida Supreme Court, which [was] composed
entirely of Democratic appointees, Gore’s lawyers found
a . . . sympathetic ear. On grounds that seemed dubious at
best and disingenuous at worst, the Florida court ruled each
time in favor of Gore. . . . [The Florida Supreme Court]
disregarded the plain language of the [Florida election]
statute and substituted a new deadline entirely of its own
making. This was obviously not “interpretation.” From its
denunciation of “hyper-technical reliance upon statutory
provisions” to its fabrication of new deadlines out of whole
cloth, the court demonstrated that it would not be bound by
the legislature’s handiwork.14
Professor Charles Fried—himself a former member of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and former United States
Solicitor General—was more pointed still.15 He began his essay by
quoting an “expla[nation of] Florida politics”16 offered by the fictional
gangster Johnny Rocco in the 1948 movie, Key Largo:
You hick! . . . I take a nobody, see? . . . Get his name in the
papers and pay for his campaign expenses. . . . Get my boys
to bring the voters out. And then count the votes over and
over again till they added up right and he was elected.17
Having set the stage with this unsubtle suggestion of fraud and
chicane in the Sunshine State, Fried proceeded to flay the Florida
Supreme Court for its “clear act of insubordination”18 to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board (Bush
I) decision,19 the Rehnquist Court’s first foray into the Florida 2000
litigation. In Bush I, the U.S. Supreme Court

13. Richard A. Epstein, “In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct”: The
Outcome in Bush v Gore Defended, in THE VOTE, supra note 2, at 36.
14. Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v Gore, in THE VOTE, supra
note 2, at 101, 108–09.
15. Charles Fried, An Unreasonable Reaction to a Reasonable Decision, in LEGITIMACY,
supra note 2, at 3.
16. Id.
17. Id. (emphasis altered).
18. Id. at 9.
19. 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam).
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had unanimously vacated [a prior] judgment of the Florida
Supreme Court and asked the Florida court to clarify the
basis for it. The Florida court . . . had disregarded the
Supreme Court’s mandate, and without even adverting to it,
had given important effect to its own previous, now
vacated, decision. . . . [Thus, the] Florida court, in a dispute
that touched the whole nation, acted in a strangely irregular
way[] . . . [that] gave rise to a reasonable concern that this
was partisan manipulation. (As the Bush people put it:
Keep on counting until Gore wins.)20
And if readers somehow missed the connection between this “keep
on counting” barb and his opening punch line from the Key Largo
gangster, Fried ended with a bang, intimating in his closing paragraph
that Bush v. Gore was a case in which “a state court had been caught
trying to steal the election.”21
With the lines of scholarly debate now in plain view, let us take a
step back. If, correctly or incorrectly, the Rehnquist Court believed that
the Florida Supreme Court was indeed acting in bad faith, then perhaps
this belief could explain why the U.S. Supremes felt they had to stop the
recount altogether, rather than remand once again to judges whom they
had come to view as judicial cheats. Perhaps the U.S. Justices might
even have felt themselves justified in bending the law—if only to
equitably straighten out the twists that they believed had been
improperly introduced by the Florida justices. Indeed, as Professor
David Strauss has shown in a splendid essay, many things both large
and small that the Rehnquist Court did in the Bush v. Gore litigation
make the most sense if the U.S. Justices had in fact believed that they
were dealing with a lawless, partisan state bench trying to steal the
presidency for its preferred candidate.22
Suspicion arose in part because in overseeing the recount, the
Florida Supreme Court seemed to have gone well beyond the words of
the Florida election statute. Suspicion also arose because the Florida
justices were presiding over a recount with uneven standards for
counting disputed ballots.
We will come soon enough to the issue of unevenness and
inequality. For now, let’s concentrate on the claim that the Florida
20. Fried, supra note 15, at 8–10.
21. Id. at 19 (claiming that the “mirror image” of the actual Bush v. Gore would have been
a case in which “a state court had been caught trying to steal the election for George Bush,” thus
implying that in Bush v. Gore itself, the Florida Supreme Court was caught trying to steal the
election for Al Gore).
22. David A. Strauss, Bush v Gore: What Were They Thinking?, in THE VOTE, supra note
2, at 185.
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justices were clearly wrong or perhaps even lawlessly partisan because
they did not hew strictly to the letter of the Florida Election Code.
In his concurring opinion in Bush v. Gore, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,23 declared that by straying from
the text of the election law adopted by the Florida Legislature, the
Florida Supreme Court had violated the federal Constitution’s Article II,
Section 1, Clause 2, which provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in
such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,” presidential
electors. For these three Justices—and for many subsequent scholarly
defenders of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ultimate decision in Bush v.
Gore, such as Professors Epstein, McConnell, and Fried—the key word
here is legislature. The U.S. Constitution says that the state legislature
gets to make the rules about how presidential electors are to be chosen.
And, the argument runs, if the state judiciary disregards those rules, the
federal Constitution itself authorizes federal judges to step in to protect
the state legislature’s federally guaranteed role.
The Article II issue first arose in Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board v. Harris,24 an earlier round of the recount litigation. In a
unanimous decision handed down in late November 2000, the Florida
Supreme Court openly referred to its decades-long tradition of
construing the Florida election statute in light of the Florida
Constitution.25 In particular, the Florida justices stressed the right to
vote as expressed in the Florida Constitution’s Declaration of Rights:
Because election laws are intended to facilitate the right of
suffrage, such laws must be liberally construed in favor of
the citizens’ right to vote[.] . . . Courts must not lose sight
of the fundamental purpose of election laws: The laws are
intended to facilitate and safeguard the right of each voter
to express his or her will in the context of our
representative democracy. Technical statutory requirements
must not be exalted over the substance of this right.26
For this reason, the Florida Supreme Court declared that the Florida
Election Code for presidential elections was valid only if the code
provisions “impose no ‘unreasonable or unnecessary restraints’ on the
23. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112–13, 122 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
24. 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000).
25. Id. at 1227–28 (“Twenty-five years ago, this Court commented that the will of the
people, not a hyper-technical reliance upon statutory provisions, should be our guiding principle
in election cases . . . . ‘By refusing to recognize an otherwise valid exercise of the right of a
citizen to vote for the sake of sacred, unyielding adherence to statutory scripture, we would in
effect nullify that right’”—a right guaranteed by “‘[o]ur federal and state constitutions.’”
(quoting Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 263 (Fla. 1975))).
26. Id. at 1237 (footnotes omitted).
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right of suffrage[]” guaranteed by the state constitution.27 On December
4, 2000, in Bush I, the Rehnquist Court unanimously vacated the Florida
Supreme Court’s Palm Beach ruling. 28 The Bush I Court’s short per
curiam opinion hinted that the Florida justices may well have violated
the federal Constitution’s Article II by using the Florida state
constitution to limit the Florida state legislature—the body that, as we
have seen, is broadly empowered by Article II to prescribe rules for
presidential elections.29
On remand, the Florida Supreme Court failed to explain clearly why,
notwithstanding Article II’s broad grant of power to the Florida
Legislature, the Florida judiciary nevertheless had understood itself to
be authorized to use the state constitution to cabin, modify, disregard,
and supplement various parts of the election code adopted by the state
legislature.30 Whereas the initial Palm Beach ruling had been
unanimous, the Florida Supreme Court on December 8, 2000, split four
to three, and its chief justice, Charles Wells, dissented in an opinion that
worried aloud about the Article II issue.31 Although the Florida
Supreme Court supplemented its splintered decision three days later
with yet another opinion—this one commanding the votes of six out of
seven justices32—it was too little too late. The U.S. Supreme Court had
already granted review of the earlier decision and had stayed the recount
pending its review.33
As we have seen, Professor Fried pointed an accusatory finger at the
Florida justices for their failure to address the U.S. Supreme Court’s
concerns in Bush I about whether, and how, the Florida Constitution
could limit the Florida Legislature in the face of Article II’s seemingly
plenary empowerment of the state legislature.34 For Fried, the Florida
justices’ actions were insubordinate to the U.S. Supreme Court, to
Article II, and to the Florida Legislature.35 Professors Epstein and
McConnell likewise highlighted the Florida Supreme Court’s seeming
violation of Article II and usurpation of the Florida Legislature’s role

27. Id. at 1236 (quoting Treiman v. Malmquist, 342 So. 2d 972, 975 (Fla. 1977)).
28. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (per curiam).
29. Id. at 75–78.
30. For one promising passage that began to lay the foundation of such an explanation,
but failed to drive home the source and the breadth of the state judiciary’s authority to forcefully
deploy the state constitution in presidential elections, see Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243,
1253–54 & n.11 (Fla. 2000).
31. Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1268 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
32. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000). Chief
Justice Wells dissented. Id. at 1292 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
33. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000).
34. See Fried, supra note 15, at 3, 8–10, 19.
35. Id. at 9.
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under that federal constitutional provision.36 (Indeed, Epstein
disclaimed reliance on equal protection arguments against the Florida
justices, preferring an Article II argument that inspired the very title of
his essay—“In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct”:
The Outcome in Bush v Gore Defended.)
After the Bush I remand, it was a momentous mistake for the Florida
Supreme Court to have issued a decision that neglected to address the
Article II issue in detail. But this neglect was not necessarily the product
of intentional insubordination to the U.S. Supreme Court. The clock was
ticking down fast, and the Florida justices had many issues to deal with
all at once.37
And here is the key point: Despite their failure to address the issue
squarely, the Florida justices acted in perfect harmony with Article II,
rightly understood, when they relied on the Florida Constitution to go
behind and beyond the words of the Florida Legislature’s Election
Code. The very structure of that code deputized the Florida judiciary to
construe and implement the code’s myriad provisions in a manner that
would strictly conform to the grand voting-rights principles of the
Florida Constitution. Had the Florida Supreme Court been clearer on
this pivotal issue, either in the initial Palm Beach case or on remand, the
basic error of the Article II assault on the Florida judiciary would have
been clear for all to see. Once we understand the proper role of the
Florida Constitution in the Bush litigation, the arguments of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, and of Professors
Epstein, McConnell, and Fried do not just dissolve. They boomerang.
Here is what the Florida Supreme Court should have said:
Just as Article II of the U.S. Constitution empowers the
Florida Legislature to direct the process of selecting
presidential electors, Article II of course also allows the
Florida Legislature, if it chooses, to cabin its own power in
light of our state constitution, and to delegate the last word
to resolve and manage disputed presidential elections in
Florida to the Florida judiciary. We hereby hold that the
Florida Legislature has done just that by deputizing us, the
Florida judiciary, to construe the Florida statutes and
regulations regarding presidential elections against the
backdrop of the Florida Constitution. Indeed, the Florida
legislature has empowered us, the Florida judiciary, to
equitably adjust and modify the sometimes hypertechnical
and confusing maze of election regulations and code
provisions so as to bring the letter of election law into
36. Epstein, supra note 13, at 19–37; McConnell, supra note 14, at 103–05, 108–09.
37. See Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1279 n.2 (explaining the time crunch).
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harmony with the spirit and grand principles of the state
constitution. As our longstanding case law makes clear, the
Florida Constitution emphatically affirms the people’s right
to vote and right to have every lawful vote reflecting a
clearly discernable voter intent counted equally. We need
not decide today whether, in a presidential election, the
Florida Constitution applies of its own force; rather we hold
that the Florida Constitution applies simply because the
Florida Legislature has made it applicable and has
deputized us to vindicate its spirit in presidential elections
here in Florida.
This legislative power is not merely consistent with
Article II; it derives from Article II. In general, no federal
court (not even the U.S. Supreme Court!) may lawfully
intervene to protect the Florida Legislature from the Florida
courts in the name of Article II, for any such federal court
intervention would itself violate the very principle of
Article II being asserted. To repeat: pursuant to Article II,
the Florida Legislature has designated the Florida judiciary
as its chosen deputy in this matter.
Surely Article II would have been satisfied had the
Florida election statute explicitly stated that “every
provision of this presidential election code should be
construed or judicially revised to conform to the letter and
spirit of the right to vote under the Florida Constitution’s
Declaration of Rights, as that Declaration has been and will
continue to be definitively construed by the Florida
judiciary.” We believe that the Florida statute has done just
that in substance, albeit in different words. Here is why:
The Florida Election Code rules for presidential elections
are the same as the Florida Election Code rules for other
elections, including state elections for state positions. It is
absolutely clear that the Florida Constitution does apply to
these other elections. It is equally clear that this Court—the
Florida Supreme Court—is broadly empowered to protect
the fundamental state constitutional right to vote in these
state elections, even if protecting that right may require this
Court to go beyond and behind the strict and at times
hypertechnical words of the statutes and regulations. Unless
the state legislature clearly indicates otherwise—and it has
never done so—the same interpretive principles concerning
the importance of the right to vote and the authority of
Florida judges to construe all rules and regulations against
the backdrop of that right apply to presidential elections as
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well.
For example, if a voter were to use an ink pen rather
than a lead pencil to fill in the oval bubble that appeared
next to a candidate’s name on a printed ballot, longstanding
Florida case law makes it clear that this pen mark would
ordinarily constitute a valid vote, even if the regulations
instructed voters to use number two pencils when marking
their ballots. Given that pen marks on a particular ballot
should be counted in an election for state representative, or
for any other state, local, or federal official, surely the
presidential-election section of the ballot should be handled
the same way. It would be odd indeed—absent a very clear
legislative indication to the contrary—to count pen marks
everywhere else on this ballot and yet refuse to count
virtually identical pen marks in the presidential-election
section of the very same ballot.
Alas! The Florida justices never offered up such a crisp and cogent
Article II explanation of their conduct in the 2000 election—although
they did come very close to doing so in a too-little-too-late decision
handed down days after the Rehnquist Court had dramatically stayed
the recount and indeed just hours before that Court’s final ruling in
Bush v. Gore.38 Despite their failure to hammer home the Article II
propriety of their earlier reliance on the Florida Constitution, I believe
that the Florida justices’ actions in general were legally defensible, and
often quite admirable, when understood in light of what I have just
said.39 Though the Florida Supreme Court did not explain itself
38. Id. at 1282, 1291. In general, subsequent scholarly commentary has tended to slide
past the three crucial Article II points, as I see them. First, regardless of whether the Florida
Constitution applied of its own automatic self-executing force to the presidential election in
Florida, it surely did apply because the Florida Legislature implicitly incorporated its principles
into the basic structure of the unitary Florida election statute. Second, the Florida Supreme
Court failed to make this first point crystal clear in its initial expositions. Third, had the Florida
Supreme Court made the first point clear before the Rehnquist Court issued its fateful December
9 stay, the basic error of the Rehnquist concurrence would have been glaringly obvious—
Rehnquist’s Article II argument boomerangs once we see that the Florida Legislature itself gave
the Florida judiciary the authority to deploy the Florida Constitution to interpret and implement
the entire statutory election code and to adjust or even abandon provisions of the code that
violated basic state constitutional principles, as construed by the state judiciary. For a
particularly thoughtful, albeit less emphatic, exposition of the first point, see Robert A.
Schapiro, Conceptions and Misconceptions of State Constitutional Law in Bush v. Gore, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 661, 683–88 (2001).
39. Although the notion that a state court can cabin, modify, disregard, and even
supplement—in effect, “rewrite”—various parts of a state statute in order to bring the statute in
conformity with the state constitution might initially raise an eyebrow, the judicial power to
“rewrite” a statute in certain situations is simply one aspect of American-style judicial review.
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perfectly in the rush of the moment, it largely did the right legal things
and for the right legal reasons. What is more, its rulings in November
and December of 2000 were quite consistent with its rulings on similar
election issues that had arisen long before George W. Bush squared off
against Al Gore. (The same, alas, cannot generally be said of the
Rehnquist Court.)
Early on in the Bush-Gore litigation, the Florida justices intuitively
saw the presidential election in light of similar issues that had come
before them (and before other state supreme courts with similar state
constitutional guarantees) in previous non-presidential elections.40 In
these earlier cases, the Florida courts and other, similarly situated state
supreme courts had at times gone beyond—and even against—the strict
letter of election laws in order to vindicate the larger spirit behind those
laws, a spirit aimed at assuring that all votes would in fact be counted if
voter intent could be deduced.41 According to this longstanding and
admirable set of cases, in Florida and elsewhere, even if a code or a
regulation instructed a given voter to use a pencil to check a box or fill
in a bubble on a printed ballot, a ballot that used a pen (a technical
“undervote”) should still be counted. Even if a code or a regulation
instructed a voter not to write in the name of any candidate whose name
already appeared printed on the ballot, a ballot that both checked the
box alongside the candidate name and also wrote in the same name (a
technical “overvote”) should be counted. A fortiori, a voter should not
have his or her vote go uncounted because some bureaucrat goofed or
some machine failed to give effect to the voter’s obvious and manifest
intent. The Florida Legislature was fully aware of judicial rulings such
as this, and the state legislature blessed this well-established case law
when it continued to enact election statutes against the backdrop of, and
in extended dialogue with, the various election-law rulings of the
Florida courts.

For a prominent recent example of a federal court in effect “rewriting” a federal statute so as to
render that statute compliant with the federal Constitution as construed by the Court, see United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244–68 (2005) (opinion of the Court in part, per Breyer, J.),
which effectively rewrote a federal sentencing guidelines statute so as to bring the statute into
compliance with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. For an even more
recent case in which the U.S. Supreme Court sharply bent the seemingly plain meaning of a
statute in order to minimize the statute’s arguable unconstitutionality, see Nw. Austin Mun. Util.
Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009), a case argued and decided only weeks after
this lecture was delivered.
40. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1236–38 (Fla. 2000).
41. See, e.g., Treiman v. Malmquist, 342 So. 2d 972, 975 (Fla. 1977); Boardman v.
Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 269–70 (Fla. 1975); State ex rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49, 50–51
(Fla. 1940). See generally Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009).
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One final, parenthetical, point on this topic. Nothing in the Florida
election code said that Florida courts owed super-strong, unwavering
deference to all rulings of the secretary of state or county election
boards, regardless of the context of the election issue involved or the
reasonableness of the initial rulings made by these nonjudicial officials.
General principles of state constitutional law and state administrative
law properly counseled judicial skepticism of such nonjudicial decisionmakers where basic elements of the fundamental right to vote were at
stake and where these nonjudicial officials appeared to be acting in a
highly partisan or highly inexpert manner.42
Nothing in Florida’s laws or traditions required the secretary of state
in 2000 to be law-trained, and in fact, Secretary of State Katherine
Harris was not law-trained. She showed dubious legal judgment in
deciding before the 2000 election to serve as a campaign official for
candidate George W. Bush. (Professor Steven Calabresi, the co-founder
of the Federalist Society, has labeled her decision “foolish.”)43 Early
rulings made by Ms. Harris raised a vivid specter of severe partisanship,
and also suggested that she simply failed to fully appreciate the deep
constitutional principle that every legal vote with a truly discernable
voter intent should be counted, regardless of bureaucratic mumbo
jumbo or statutory legalese. (One particularly important Harris ruling
early on was sharply and persuasively contested by the Florida Attorney
General’s office, an office with a long tradition of legal and state
constitutional expertise.)44 The law-trained Florida justices were
sensitive stewards of deep and longstanding constitutional principles
when they declined to give blind deference to dubious decision-makers
such as Harris.
II. THE ROLE(S) OF THE LEGISLATURE(S)
Let us now turn to focus even more directly on the entity explicitly
empowered by Article II, namely, the Florida Legislature.
In the umpteen-ring circus that was Florida 2000—with riveting
dramas and curious comedies simultaneously playing out in various
county canvassing boards, in multiple state and federal judicial
proceedings, in the Florida Secretary of State’s office, in the Florida
Attorney General’s office, and elsewhere—the Florida Legislature also
craved a piece of the action and a part of the limelight. Meeting in
Tallahassee, lawmakers in late November and early December began to
make noises about their alleged right to take matters into their own
hands by naming their own set of electors (who would be pledged to
42. See Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89
CAL. L. REV. 1721, 1743 & n.113 (2001).
43. Steven G. Calabresi, A Political Question, in LEGITIMACY, supra note 2, at 129, 132.
44. Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 2000-65 (2000), 2000 WL 1707267, at *1–3.
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George W. Bush) if the recount did not end quickly and with the proBush result that these legislators demanded.
At first blush, such a legislative assertion might seem wholly
justifiable. As we have seen, Article II explicitly empowers the state
legislature to direct how presidential electors shall be chosen. But on
sober second thought, the rumblings of the Florida legislators should
strike us as deeply troubling. For the Florida Legislature had already
spoken—had already laid down the rules in its initial election laws.
These rules provided that the Florida judiciary—and not the Florida
Legislature—would ultimately oversee and adjudicate electoral disputes
for all elections (other than, perhaps, elections for state legislative
positions, for which each legislative house might indeed claim state
constitutional authority to be the final election judge45).
To be clear: Prior to the November election, the Florida Legislature
was not obliged to have structured the presidential election rules as it
did. Had it so chosen, the Florida Legislature in, say, January 2000,
might have enacted a law naming itself as the arbitration board of all
presidential election disputes that might arise in November. Going
against the grain of the unbroken and universal state practice of the last
century and a half, perhaps the Florida Legislature might even have
chosen to dispense with a presidential election altogether in Florida. In
this weird alternative universe, perhaps the Florida legislators might
have simply provided that the legislature itself would name its own set
of presidential electors come November—the voters be damned!
But of course, the Florida Legislature did none of these things prior
to election day. Instead, it kept in place its traditional election and
adjudication process, which contemplated no ongoing legislative role
after the people of Florida had spoken on election day and the courts
had adjudged any legal issues that might have arisen. Had the
legislature in December 2000 actually tried to insinuate itself into the
process, it would have been changing the rules in the middle of—
actually, after!—the game, in violation of basic rule-of-law ideals.
To recast the point in the more technical language of Article II, the
“legislature” that was constitutionally empowered was the Florida
Legislature before election day—not the Florida Legislature after
election day. Any effort by that later legislature to change the rules
would have come at the expense of the pre-election day legislature—the
legislature empowered by Article II—and would thus have violated
Article II itself, much as the Rehnquist concurrence that we considered
earlier did violence to the very Article II provision it claimed to be
championing. Therefore, in both Tallahassee and Washington, D.C., the
45. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“Each house shall be the sole judge of the qualifications,
elections, and returns of its members . . . .”).
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pro-Bush argument based on Article II did not merely dissolve; it
boomeranged.
Other constitutional and federal statutory language completes and
confirms this rule-of-law point. As we have seen, Article II, Section 1,
Clause 2 does empower the state legislature; but one paragraph later,
Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 clarifies the temporal boundaries of that
empowerment: “The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the
Electors . . . .” Acting pursuant to that clause, Congress long ago
enacted a federal statute which clearly says that presidential electors
shall be appointed in each state on America’s traditional election day—
the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November.46 With this
statute, Congress made plain which state legislature is empowered
under Article II—namely, the legislature acting before election day.
But what should happen if the election-day selection process
misfires? Here, too, Congress laid down a clear rule long ago, pursuant
to its explicit authorization under Article II, Section 1, Clause 4.
According to Congress, “Whenever any State has held an election for
the purpose of choosing electors, and has failed to make a choice on the
day prescribed by law, the electors may be appointed on a subsequent
day in such a manner as the legislature of such State may direct.”47 This
section does empower a post-election day legislature to jump back into
the game and to oust the voters—but only if the election “failed to make
a choice.” Imagine, for example, that Florida election law provided that
a candidate would win electors on election day only if the candidate
received an absolute majority of the statewide popular vote; but in a
three-way race, no candidate emerged with such an absolute majority on
election day. Under those circumstances, the Florida Legislature could
step in post-election.
But nothing of the sort happened in 2000. The voters had made a
choice on election day. True, uncertainty existed about which candidate
the voters had in fact chosen. But this was not a failed election;48 it was
simply a very close election, one that called for an extremely careful
final count. Nothing in the language of the congressional statute
suggests any right of the state legislature to overturn the voters’ verdict
under these circumstances, and indeed the clear negative implication of
the congressional statute is that the state legislature has no such right,
46. 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
47. Id. § 2.
48. Laurence H. Tribe, eroG .v hsuB: Through the Looking Glass, in LEGITIMACY, supra
note 2, at 39, 59 (stating that federal statute “empowers a state legislature to direct the choice of
a new set of electors only when the state ‘has held an election . . . and has failed to make a
choice on the day prescribed by law,’ not when it has made a choice but the choice has yet to be
ascertained.”); but see Calabresi, supra note 44, at 134 (suggesting, albeit with a notable hedge,
that “[b]ecause Florida had arguably failed to make a choice on November 7,” the Florida
Legislature could properly jump back in under the terms of 3 U.S.C. § 2) (emphasis added).
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outside the context of a truly failed election—that is, an election that
had not yet generated and that never would generate a legally sufficient
outcome after careful tabulation. It would be outlandish to read the
congressional law as allowing a state legislature to oust the voters if no
definitive victor had been declared before midnight on Election Night.
And if the legislature may not oust the voters on the Wednesday
morning after election day simply because careful counting is still
taking place, then surely the legislature may likewise not oust the voters
on any subsequent day simply because the counting continues. Nothing
in the language of the federal statute suggests that the rule that
obviously applies on the Wednesday morning after the election
somehow lapses on Thursday or Friday or any later day.49
Here, too, it would seem that the harsh critics of the Florida judiciary
have gotten the issue precisely wrong. The real problem in Florida 2000
was not that the state courts were inappropriately threatening to usurp
the proper constitutional authority of the state legislature, but the
reverse: The state legislature was inappropriately threatening to usurp
the proper constitutional authority of the state courts (and of the preelection state legislature that had deputized the state courts).
True, in late 2000 there was in fact one court that inappropriately
inserted itself at the expense of the legislature—the Rehnquist Court,
which took upon itself to resolve various issues that were properly
Congress’ to decide as the body tasked by the U.S. Constitution with the
counting of electoral votes and the resolution of electoral-vote
disputes.50 The federal Constitution thus envisioned a certain
adjudicatory role for Congress in presidential elections; however, state
legislatures were not given a precisely analogous role.
In its rush to judgment, then, the Rehnquist Court not only did an
injustice to the Florida judiciary—and to the pre-election Florida
Legislature that had deputized the Florida judiciary—but also to
Congress, and to the constitutional structure that made the federal
legislature, and not the federal judiciary, the ultimate judge of close
presidential elections.51

49. Nor would a broad reading of the word “failure” vindicate Congress’ purpose in
enacting a uniform election day. “Congress established a level playing field among the states by
requiring them to hold elections on the same day . . . Before [Congress enacted this statute]
states competed with one another for influence by setting their election dates as late as possible,
thereby swinging close elections by voting last.” Bruce Ackerman, Op-Ed., As Florida
Goes . . ., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at A33, available at 2000 WLNR 3191101. A loose
reading of the word “failure” would encourage states to game the system in the very ways the
statute was designed to prohibit.
50. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII; 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
51. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 208–09,
210–11 (Random House Trade 2005).
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III. EQUAL PROTECTION
What about the claim that the recount being overseen by the Florida
judiciary was proceeding with unacceptably uneven standards? Here,
too, upon close inspection, many of the criticisms hurled at the Florida
Supreme Court do not merely dissolve; they boomerang. The
unevenness occurring in the judicially monitored recount was in general
far less severe than the unevenness that had occurred in the initial, lessmonitored counts on election day and shortly thereafter.52 In many
ways, the recount process being supervised by the Florida Supreme
Court represented the last best chance to reduce and judicially remedy
some of the inequalities and inaccuracies and disenfranchisements that
had tainted the initial counting process. Some of the problems that
seemed to surface in initial and intermediate stages of the recount might
well have been cured by later corrective action from state judges, had
these judges been allowed to proceed without interference from the
Rehnquist Court, and with Congress waiting in the wings as the ultimate
monitor and constitutionally appropriate final judge. Alternatively, the
U.S. Supremes might have identified their specific concerns about the
unfolding recount and remanded the matter to state courts with
guidelines for a still-better recount process. Instead, by abruptly
demanding an end to the recount process, the Rehnquist Court simply
froze in place inequalities of the same sort, and of a greater magnitude,
than the inequalities the Court claimed to care about.
What were the inequalities that captured the Court’s imagination?
During the recount process being overseen by the Florida judiciary,
some dimpled chads were being treated as valid votes, others not.
According to the Rehnquist Court per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore,
the standards for accepting or rejecting contested ballots
might vary not only from county to county but indeed
within a single county from one recount team to
another. . . . A monitor in Miami-Dade County testified at
trial that he observed that three members of the county
canvassing board applied different standards in defining a
legal vote. And testimony at trial also revealed that at least
one county changed its evaluative standards during the
counting process. . . . This is not a process with sufficient
guarantees of equal treatment.53

52. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 48, at 50 (“Minority voters were roughly ten times as
likely not to have their votes correctly counted in this election as were non-minority
voters . . . .”).
53. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2000) (internal citation omitted).
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This passage raises many questions.54 If the Florida recount was
constitutionally flawed, why wasn’t the initial Florida count—which the
Court’s judgment in effect reinstated—even more flawed? The initial
count, we must remember, featured highly uneven standards from
county to county. Different counties used different ballots (including the
infamous butterfly ballot); and even counties using the same ballot used
different interpretive standards in counting them. This happened not just
in Florida, but across the country. Were all these elections
unconstitutional?
The idea that the Constitution requires absolute perfection and
uniformity of standards in counting and/or recounting ballots is novel,
to put it gently. For decades, if not centuries, American voters have
been asked to put their “X” marks in boxes next to candidate names,
and human umpires have had to judge if the “X” is close enough to the
box to count. On election day, different umpires officiating in different
precincts have always called slightly different strike zones. If these
judgments are made in good faith and within a small zone of close calls,
why are they unconstitutional? If they are unconstitutional, then
virtually every election in American history has been unconstitutional.
As we have already seen, regardless of what the U.S. Supremes may
themselves have thought at the time, it was a mistake to believe that the
Florida recount process was proceeding in some especially bad-faith
manner that should have caused that process to be viewed with more
suspicion than the initial counting process (which occurred without
judicial oversight). The Rehnquist Court claimed that its new-minted
equality principles applied only to judicially supervised state recounts,
and not necessarily to other aspects of the electoral system.55 But the
Court gave no principled reason for this absurdly ad hoc limitation. The
fact that the Bush case involved recounts monitored by a judge with
statewide supervisory power cuts precisely against the per curiam
opinion: Generally speaking, less cheating in tabulation is likely when
judges and special masters—and the eyes of the world—are watching;
and a court with a statewide mandate could help mitigate inequalities
across different parts of the state. True, in a recount it might at times be
foreseeable that a particular ruling might tend to favor a given
candidate, but this was also true of various rulings made during or even
54. Some of the material contained in the remainder of this section is borrowed from
Akhil Reed Amar, Op-Ed., Should We Trust Judges?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2000, at M1,
available at 2000 WLNR 8345547.
55. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109 (“The recount process, in its features here described, is
inconsistent with the minimum procedures necessary to protect the fundamental right of each
voter in the special instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a single state judicial
officer. Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal
protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.”).
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before the initial counting.
Critics of the recount, both on and off the Rehnquist Court, were also
far too quick to think they had somehow established smoking-gun
evidence of foul play—“Aha!”—whenever they pointed to certain
changes in counting protocols over time or certain variations across
space. True, various Florida counties in the past had not counted
dimpled chads.56 But the Florida Supreme Court had not blessed this
past practice; and no uniform anti-dimple rule applied in the many sister
states that, like Florida, affirmed the primacy of voter intent.57 Facts
matter. If, for example, certain precincts in 2000 had particularly high
rates of dimples or other mechanical undercounts, this statistic might
well be evidence of chad buildup or machine deterioration over the
years. A strict anti-dimple rule that made sense in 1990 might not have
been sensible a decade later, given much older machines, more buildup,
and a higher incidence of machine undercounts.58
So too, the chad-rule in precincts with short lines might not sensibly
apply to precincts with much longer lines, where some voters may have
felt a special need to vote fast so that others could take their turns. If in
precincts where lines were longest and voters were most hurried—or
were especially elderly and frail, or especially unlikely to understand
English-language instructions about the proper use of punch-card
styluses—the rates of dimpled chads or other undercounts were
especially high, it might well make sense to treat dimples in those
precincts as particularly likely to reflect genuine attempted votes rather
than intentional nonvotes.59 These sorts of issues could not have been
easily addressed in each precinct on election day itself; but, they were
just the sort of problems that a statewide court might have been able to
address sensibly with an adequate factual background developed in the
very process of recounting, a process in which fine-grained data about
the precinct-by-precinct (and even machine-by-machine) distribution of
each sort of voting problem would become available. But the U.S.
Supremes short-circuited the whole recount and remedy process,
privileging the less accurate, less inclusive, and more discriminatory
initial counting process—and privileging that highly unequal process in
the name of equality, no less!
The Rehnquist Court per curiam failed to cite a single case that, on
its facts, came close to supporting the majority’s analysis and result.60
56. Id. at 106–07.
57. See, e.g., Delahunt v. Johnston, 671 N.E.2d 1241, 1242–43 (Mass. 1996).
58. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 106–07.
59. See Tribe, supra note 48, at 45–46.
60. For a fascinating analysis of earlier Rehnquist Court election-law cases with very
different facts, but similar voting line-ups, see Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, in
THE VOTE, supra note 2, at 140.
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To be sure, we can find lots of forceful voting-equality language in the
Supreme Court’s pre-Bush case law—but on their facts, these cases
were mainly about citizens simply being denied the right to vote
(typically on race or class lines); or being assigned formally unequal
voting power, with some (typically white) districts being
overrepresented at the expense of other (typically black) districts.
The Equal Protection Clause was, first and foremost, designed to
remedy the inequalities heaped upon blacks in America. The Fifteenth
Amendment extended this idea by prohibiting race discrimination with
respect to the vote. Yet, governments in the South mocked these rules
for most of the twentieth century. For decades, most American blacks
were simply not allowed to vote. When Congress finally acted to even
things up in the 1960s, inequality persisted as a practical matter. In
Florida, for example, black precincts in 2000 typically had much
glitchier voting machines, which generated undercounts many times the
rate of wealthier (white) precincts with sleek voting technology.61 In
raw numbers this sizable inequality far exceeded the picayune
discrepancies magnified by the Rehnquist Court. Under-maintenance of
voting machines, chad build-up, long voting lines in poor precincts—
these were some of the real ballot inequalities in Florida 2000.
In Florida 2000, those who were the most serious about real equality,
as envisioned by the architects of Reconstruction, persuasively argued
that the government should not ignore the very large and racially
nonrandom voting-machine skew. Rather, the government should do its
best to minimize and remedy that skew, albeit imperfectly, via manual
recounts. Even if such recounts were not required by equality, surely
they were not prohibited by equality.62 In fixating on the small glitches
of the recount rather than on the large and systemic glitches of the
machines, the Rehnquist Court majority turned a blind eye to the real
inequalities staring them in the face, piously attributing the problems to
“voter error” (as opposed to outdated and seriously flawed machines)
and inviting “legislative bodies” to fix the mess for future elections.63
IV. VOTER INTENT IN BUSH VERSUS GORE AND BUSH V. GORE
Before I conclude, I should like to highlight one more aspect of Bush
versus Gore (the election) and Bush v. Gore (the case). Let’s talk for a
few moments about voter intent.
Think first about the election. Sometimes, a voter might sensibly cast
a vote for someone who is not in fact the voter’s true first choice. Via a
strategic vote, a voter might well vote for candidate A, even though she
61. See supra note 48, at 50.
62. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 147 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 103–04 (per curiam).
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truly prefers candidate C—because a sincere vote for C may increase
the odds that her least favorite candidate, B, might win. Thus, in Florida
2000, many voters strategically voted for Al Gore, even if they sincerely
preferred Ralph Nader, because they understood that a sincere vote for
Nader would make it more likely that George W. Bush would in fact
prevail. (And to those who actually did cast their votes for Nader, I ask:
“What were you thinking?”)
Other voters in Florida failed to vote for their true first choice not
because they were strategic but because they were confused. Recall the
infamous butterfly ballot, which effectively disfranchised thousands
who fully intended to and in fact tried to vote for Gore, but who ended
up casting mistaken ballots that had to be counted in favor of Patrick
Buchanan. Consider finally, overvotes and undervotes. In an overvote, a
voter might, in confusion, vote for two different candidates for the same
single position—say, both Bush and Gore. In an undervote, a confused
voter might simply fail to indicate which candidate he or she truly
preferred.
Now turn from Bush versus Gore, the election, to Bush v. Gore, the
case. Here too, we can see strategic voting in action, and also possibly
confused voting—both overvotes and undervotes.
First, strategic voting. There are good reasons to suspect that Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas did not, deep down,
sincerely agree with the exuberant and unprecedented equal protection
analysis at the heart of the per curiam opinion that these three Justices
formally joined. The equal protection approach ran counter to the
general approach that these three Justices had typically followed in prior
equal protection and voting rights cases. The per curiam also raised
some special problems for principled originalists. (There is strong
evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended or written to
apply to voting discrimination.64 This is indeed why a wholly separate
amendment—the Fifteenth Amendment—was understood by the
Reconstruction generation to be needed to end race-based suffrage
laws.65 Ordinarily, the inapplicability of the Equal Protection Clause
might be thought to be a moot point for dedicated originalists because
most of the voting cases that have relied on the Equal Protection Clause
could be reconceptualized and defended as Article IV republican
government cases. But, Article IV would not seem to apply to a
presidential election.)
Moreover, the equal protection argument was in considerable tension
64. See generally AMAR, supra note 51, at 391–92 (noting that the Reconstructionists in
1866 made clear that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to civil and not political rights such as
voting and militia service); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 216–17 & n.* (Yale University Press 1998) (same).
65. AMAR, supra note 51, at 392.
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with the Article II analysis favored by these three concurring Justices.
The more one insists on the plenary power of state legislatures under
Article II to call the shots in presidential elections, the more awkward it
is to also insist that the state must satisfy a super-strict system of voting
equality, down to uniform micro-standards for evaluating chads,
regardless of the counting and recounting system established by the
legislature itself.
Why, then, did the three believers in the Article II argument join
what they probably saw as a highly problematic and implausible equal
protection opinion? In other words, why did they opt to concur in the
per curiam opinion rather than simply concur in the judgment based
solely on their Article II theory? Most likely, because they were voting
strategically (much as the Naderites who voted for Gore in Florida).
Without their three votes for the per curiam opinion, Bush v. Gore
would have been a case in which there were five votes to end the
recount and decide the election, but no single majority opinion or
majority theory to justify this outcome. Imagine how the New York
Times headline the next day might have read: Court Backs Bush But
Cannot Agree Why. Or imagine the lead paragraph of such a news story:
Last night, for the first time in American history, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided a presidential election. By a
5-4 vote, the Court conclusively stopped votes from
being recounted in Florida, even though a majority of
Justices in fact rejected each of the only two theories put
forth by the Bush campaign to end the recount. The only
things the five Justices could agree on were that George
W. Bush must win, Al Gore must lose, and the counting
must stop.66
Strategic voting, it would seem, may thus well have occurred both in
Florida and in Washington, D.C.
So too, at least one Justice in the case appears to have overvoted and
undervoted, as did some confused Floridians the previous month.
Justice Breyer joined in full both Justice Stevens’ dissent and Justice
Souter’s dissent, even though these two dissents took diametrically
opposite positions on the plausibility of the per curiam opinion’s equal
protection analysis. Justice Stevens thought the argument was a clear
66. For a similar analysis of the Justices’ behavior in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), see PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 836 (5th ed. 2006). For a wide-ranging discussion of
possible strategic voting in Bush v. Gore, see generally Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L.
Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political Economy of Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV.
1849 (2001).
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loser, whereas Justice Souter bought this turkey.67 And Justice Breyer—
who is, I can personally attest as his former law clerk, one of the
world’s most agreeable humans—agreed entirely with both Justices
Stevens and Souter.68 Which brings to mind one of my favorite punch
lines from Fiddler on the Roof: “But, Rabbi, they can’t both be right!”
Nor is the matter completely clarified in Justice Breyer’s own opinion,
in which he acknowledged that there were equality problems with the
Florida recount, but did not quite say that these problems rose to the
level of a constitutional violation.69 I would call this an undervote, with
no clear voter intent on the part of Justice Breyer. On this issue, my old
boss and dear friend was as enigmatic as some of the dimpled Florida
punchcards at the center of the storm.
V. REFORM
Ten years ago this week, Professor Sunstein’s Dunwody Lecture
moved from the 1999 impeachment “debacle” to various proposals for
“reform.”70 Over the past hour, we have dwelt long enough on the
debacle (if that is indeed the right word) of Florida 2000. It is time, in
conclusion, to envision reform.
Although I have been quite critical of the Rehnquist Court’s per
curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore, I do strongly agree with that part of the
opinion that spoke of the need for “legislative bodies nationwide [to]
examine ways to improve the mechanisms and machinery for voting.”71
Nor is this the only sort of reform that is desperately needed. In
Florida 2000, a shockingly large number of lawful voters were
incorrectly, and in many cases illegally, purged from state voting rolls

67. Compare Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The federal
questions that ultimately emerged in this case are not substantial.”), with id. at 133–34 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (“It is only on the [equal protection] issue before us that there is a meritorious
argument for relief, as this Court’s per curiam opinion recognizes. . . . I can conceive of no
legitimate state interest served by these differing treatments of the expressions of voters’
fundamental rights. The differences appear wholly arbitrary.”).
68. Id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer); id. at 129
(Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Breyer and joined in part by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg).
69. Id. at 145–46 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[S]ince the use of different standards could
favor one or the other of the candidates, since time was, and is, too short to permit the lower
courts to iron out significant differences through ordinary judicial review, and since the relevant
distinction was embodied in the order of the State’s highest court, I agree that, in these very
special circumstances, basic principles of fairness may well have counseled the adoption of a
uniform standard to address the problem. In light of the majority’s disposition, I need not decide
whether, or the extent to which, as a remedial matter, the Constitution would place limits upon
the content of the uniform standard.”).
70. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 599.
71. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 5 [2009], Art. 1

968

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

on Katherine Harris’ watch.72 Even today, both in Florida and beyond,
government officials have often made it too difficult to register to vote
and too difficult to actually cast a vote on election day. Under the
banner of combating fraud, many jurisdictions are imposing
inappropriate burdens on those who are fully eligible to vote. The
massive disenfranchisement of ex-felons—men and women who are,
after all, our fellow citizens and who are disproportionately persons of
color—is a genuine cause for concern.
At this late hour, I shall not burden you with my own pet list of
reforms. Instead, I ask only that each of you in this room today begin to
think seriously about the topic. To get you started, let me simply remind
you that at end of the eighteenth century, Americans astonished the
world by enacting a Constitution that had actually been voted upon by
people across an entire continent. Never before in world history had
such a thing occurred.73 It was an amazing democratic reform—and the
world has never been the same.
Let me further remind you that almost exactly one century later,
America found itself in the midst of another amazing democratic reform
movement. Recall that at the turn of the twentieth century, America had
promised the elimination of racial barriers to suffrage but had yet to do
the same thing for sex barriers. Beginning at first with a few states in
the Rocky Mountains and then eventually sweeping across the land,
woman suffrage transformed the political face of America—another
truly epic expansion of democracy.74
And now, still one more century later—at the dawning of the Age of
Obama—America stands poised once again to ponder democratic first
principles. I urge all the persons in this room, and all the persons who
have occasion hereafter to read this lecture in the pages of the Florida
Law Review, to make election reform in Florida—heck, in America!—a
priority. If all of today’s listeners and tomorrow’s readers do so, we
shall have good reason to hope that when one of you stands here at this
podium in the not-too-distant future—as, say, the Dunwody Lecturer of
2019—you will be able to say to your audience, with truth in your voice
and a smile on your lips, that the right to vote has made great strides in
the new millennium.

72. See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING
2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2001), available at
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/exesum.htm.
73. See AMAR, supra note 51, at 5–10.
74. See id. at 419–28.
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